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IS INTERNATIONAL LAW FAIR?
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. xxxvi + 500 pp.
Reviewed by Gerry J. Simpson*
INTRODUCTION: THE STATE OF THEORY
International legal theory is a blossoming academic industry. What
was until quite recently a marginal, esoteric research pursuit confined to
the analysis of sources of international law or treated in the curriculum
as a one-lecture effort on "the nature of international law" is now engag-
ing some of the most acute minds in the discipline.'
This renewed enthusiasm for matters conceptual and theoretical can
be attributed, partly, to a group of scholars who fall under the rubric of
"new stream." The work of Martti Koskenniemi, David Kennedy, and
Tony Carty, among others, has inspired a new school of international
law which rather self-consciously resembles, and is heavily influenced
by, the conference of critical legal scholars. The new stream scholars
have mined a classic post-enlightenment vein in social theory in order to
shift the focus of international legal scholarship from analyses of doc-
trine to understandings of culture and policy.2
Similarly, after decades of resistance and neglect, feminists are
making their mark in the field. "Feminist Approaches to International
Law," a 1991 essay by Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and
Shelley Wright, is now a standard reference point in recent scholarship.3
* Senior Lecturer in International Law, Australian National University, Canberra. S.J.D.
Candidate, University of Michigan Law School. LL.M., University of British Columbia
(1989); M.A., Aberdeen University (1990); LL.B., Aberdeen University (1986).
The author would like to thank Camilla Newcombe, Robert McCorquodale, and Deborah
Cass for their comments. This review is dedicated to Gunnar O'Neill, University of Michigan
Law School (1968-1995).
1. A notable exception to this lack of interest in theory has been the extensive scholar-
ship of the New Haven School of international law including RICHARD A. FALK, REVITALIZ-
ING INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989); Myres S. McDougal et al., Theories About International
Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968).
2. See ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?: A REAPPRAISAL OF
THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1986); MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT (1989); David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1988).
3. Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 613 (1991).
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The breakthrough status of this article is confirmed by the impassioned
and strangely wounded criticism it has attracted from more conventional
liberal scholars such as Anthony D'Amato and Fernando Tes6n4 and by
the enormous outpouring of gender-based analysis that has arrived in its
wake.5
The rapprochement between international relations and international
law is'a third manifestation of 'this 'reawakening of interest in legal
theory. The overlapping concerns of these academic activities have at
last been the subject of several treatments appearing in international law
journals. 6 The cold war between the self-styled muscular realisms of
international relations scholarship and the insular postivisms and
idealisms of international law writing has mercifully abated even if both
camps remain diffident, as discussed below.
Meanwhile, the response to these developments from the dominant
liberal tradition in international law has been marked by a somewhat
blas6 silence. The vast body of this scholarship has remained quite
unaffected by these exciting new theoretical ventures. New stream schol-
arship has been almost completely ignored while feminism is tolerated
providing it does not attack the sacred cows of liberalism, -such as the
autonomy of the'self, the ideal of individual choice, or the imperatives
of objectivity.
A stark example of the malaise of conventional theory can be found
in self-determination writing. Neither Chinkin's plea for a self-determi-
nation which accounts for the suffering and marginality of women in
national liberation struggles nor the innovative work of Nathaniel
Berman on self-determination's roots in the great modernist projects of
the inter-war period have caused more than a ripple in recent writing.
7
Similarly, Kennedy's idiosyncratic oeuvre has been met with a head-
shaking silence from most of his colleagues in the field notwithstanding
4. See Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspec-
tives, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 840 (1995) (book review); Fernando R. Tes6n, Feminism and
International Law: A Reply, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 647 (1993).
5. See, e.g., Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International
Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 293 (1993); Anne Orford, A Feminist Analysis of
the Security Council, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373 (1996); Kris Walker, An Exploration of
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter As An Embodiment of the PubliclPrivate Distinc-
tion in International Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 173 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Law and International Relations Theory:
Building Bridges, 86 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 167 (1992); Shirley V. Scott, International
Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship Between International Law and International
Politics, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 313 (1994).
7. Christine Chinkin, A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force, AUSTL.
Y.B. INT'L L. 279 (1992); Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative is Despair": Nationalism
and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1792 (1993).
[Vol. 17:615
Is International Law Fair?
some profuse footnoting, from his own prot6g6s. 8 Meanwhile,
Charlesworth's work has been variously decried as too feminist9 and not
feminist enough' but has yet to be subjected to.the sort of sustained,
sympathetic and critical engagement which oxygenates the discipline.
Finally, international relations theory, until the recent cross-fertilizations,
confronted international law's liberal pretensions at an angle somewhere
between threat and denial. International law's progressive and reformist
visions have been dismissed by international relations scholars as hope-
lessly utopian, absurdly legalistic, or gauche and unsophisticated about
the realities of world disorder. The struggle between anarchy and
constitutionalism for conceptual dominance has long been regarded as a
mismatch by realists of various stripes. As a consequence, international
lawyers have redirected their attention toward building institutions or
perfecting theories of "sources." Again, engagement has been lacking.
I..THOMAS FRANCK'S LIBERALISM
It is within this context that Professor Tom Franck's work can
perhaps best be approached. Professor Franck is a leading light in the
American Society of International Law, the author of several treatises,
and a prolific contributor to various journals. His overall intellectual task
seems to be the defense and enrichment of liberalism in international
law theory. In this imposing volume, which began life as a series of
Hague lectures, he sets out to explain why international law works in a
world of sovereign states by elaborating a procedural liberalism (legiti-
macy) and how it is improving its prospects of. meeting the aspirations
of the disaffected by adopting the substantive principles of liberalism
(democracy and justice)." All this may or may not add up to "fairness"
but it certainly results in a compelling and ambitious body of work.
Franck, though, is renewing liberalism at a time when liberalism is
not at all fashionable with a new breed of skeptics even if it is deeply
entrenched among elite American international- lawyers. Liberalism is
the chosen target of many new stream scholars (according to them it is
vacuous, self-contradictory, and anachronistic), 2 feminist scholars (argu-
8. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Autumn Weekends: An Essay of Law and Everyday Life, in
LAW AND EVERYDAY LIFE 191 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
9. See Tes6n, supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., Adrian Howe, White Western Feminism Meets International Law: Chal-
lenges/Complicity, Erasures/Encounters, 4 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 63 (1995).
11. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS.(1995)
[hereinafter FAIRNESS].
12. See, e.g., Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 113 (1991).
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ing that liberalism is patriarchal, universalist, and essentialist), 3 and
international relations realists (asserting that liberal international law is
banal, merely hortatory, or peripheral). 4 The response from this liberal
elite has been, as I have indicated, negligible. Some major figures have
co-opted a diluted version of the law as politics message of the new
stream (Louis Henkin) 5 while others have disparaged it as based on a
misconception of true liberalism or the limits of liberalism (Rosalyn
Higgins). 16 The liberal response to feminism has been a mixture of
regret and fury. Thus, feminism comes in two forms: liberal feminism
(approved as liberalism applied to women) 17 and radical feminism
(condemned as feminism applied to men).' 8 The majority of liberal
scholars have been content to leave theory well alone. This is, of course,
the exclusive privilege of powerful groups.
It is to Professor Franck's credit that he has not merely described
international law in his Hague lectures. Franck wants to refine and
redefine liberalism, I suspect partly, to meet some of these criticisms of
the liberal project. I regard his liberalism as the most defensible and best
explicated in the field. In attempting to regenerate international legal
liberalism, Franck, in a startling apostasy, has styled himself as the
leading Rawlsian international lawyer with bits of Dworkin and Hart
thrown in for good measure. This then is not the dry, libertarian liberal-
ism of sovereign self-regulation exemplified by the Lotus decision, 9 but
a kinder gentler liberalism in which rights, democracy, and fairness can
flourish. In invoking fairness to capture a wide and disparate array of
ideas, Franck, of course, invokes Rawls whose genius lay in taking a
term as common as fairness and making it his own.2'
13. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Challenging the "New World Order": International Law,
Global Democracy and the Possibilities for Women, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
371 (1993).
14. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 275-79, 293-96 (3d ed.
1964).
15. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 25-27 (2d ed. 1979).
16. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 5 (1991).
17. See generally Tes6n, supra note 4.
18. Id.
19. The Steamship Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 9 (Sept. 7).
20. Interestingly, Franck tried to demonstrate several years ago that parts of Rawlsian
theory could not be applied to international law and, at the risk of sounding facetious, Rawls
seemed to have confirmed Franck's thesis in his own recent essay, "The Laws of Peoples."
However, Professor Franck's current efforts on behalf of fairness and justice are more
convincing than both his previous writing on the subject and Rawls' own application of
Rawlsian precepts to the philosophy of international law. Thomas M. Franck, Is Justice
Relevant to the International Legal System?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 945 (1989); John
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For Franck, as for Rawls, liberalism is a commitment to a certain
process rather than a particular end. Ironically, this preference for con-
versation over decree mimics the argument of many of liberalism's new
stream adversaries.2 The core value of modem liberalism is that there
are no ultimate values or foundational truths. This paradoxical claim is
fully worked out in Rawls' quest for an overlapping consensus.22 Thus,
according to Rawls, our most defining moral and religious commitments
are quarantined in a private sphere (e.g. the practice of worship) while
we seek agreement on our public conceptions of justice (e.g. freedom of
religion). Franck endorses this view in his discussion of trumping.23 A
requirement of fairness discourse is that theologies and ideologies be
screened out before the conversation or negotiation begins. To illustrate,
Rawlsian theory divides the self into private and public dimensions. Our
private selves are free to pursue our private ends free of interference and
according to our own private moralities. In contrast, our public selves
pursue political agreement while adopting a more circumscribed political
morality. Franckian theory would presumably allow religious states such
as Iran to pursue their values internally while excluding these spiritual
claims from fairness discourse.
II. FAIRNESS: Two ELEMENTS AND SOME DOUBTS
Fairness is the process of reaching reasonable agreement within the
parameters established by the principles of no trumping and maximin.
Procedural fairness is possible when theologies are absent (no trumping).
The limits of substantive fairness are set by the principle that the least
advantaged states or persons are favored in any proposed redistribution
of opportunities or goods (maximin). Within these limits one can imag-
ine conflicts arising between the outcomes of process and the demands
Rawls, The Laws of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds.,
1993).
21. Compare Koskenniemi:
The legitimacy of critical solutions does not lie in the intrinsic character of the
solution but in the openness of the process of conversation and evaluation through
which it has been chosen and in the way it accepts the possibility of revision - in
the authenticity of the participants' will to agree[.]
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 487, with Franck: "Fairness as a destination remains for us
always an open question. What matters is the opportunity for discourse: the process and its
rules . .. . The issue is not a society's definition of fairness in any particular instance, but
rather the openness of the process by which those definitions are reached." FAIRNESS, supra
note 11, at 83.
22. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993).
23. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 16-18.
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of justice. According to Franck, "[f]airness is the rubric under which
[the] tension [between substantive distributive justice and procedural
right process] is discursively managed."'24 Thus we are back with E.H,
Carr's and more recently, Koskenniemi's apology/utopia razor.25 Of
course, process fairness is more than just the absence of trumping, just
as justice is limited but not defined by the maximin principle. In the
next two subsections, I discuss the content of these two potentially
contradictory forces in the international system.
A. Legitimacy
Franck begins his exposition on legitimacy by harking back to the
contractarian liberalisms of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, and Kant.26 States
remain central and their consent remains vital to the achievement of
normativity. However, normativity and consent are achieved in many
cases where self-interest is lacking. Where does international law derive
its capacity to bind unwilling sovereign actors? According to Franck,
legitimacy is the key.
International law's procedural fairness, then, is derived from its
legitimacy. However, legitimacy is inherently conservative. It endorses
the current ordering and is a force for stability. Franck has no qualms
about this because substantive fairness offsets this stability by providing
the system with its dynamic aspects. But why legitimacy? Franck argues
that legitimacy ". . . accommodates a deeply felt popular belief that for
a system of rules to be fair, it must be firmly rooted in a framework of
formal requirements .... 27 In other words, as citizens we expect con-
sistency and generality in the application of regulatory conditions.
Franck thus situates himself firmly in a rule of law tradition whose
major proponents have been Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart. The require-
ments of legitimacy have been developed at some length by Franck
elsewhere and are merely sketched in this book.28 There has always been
something rather circular about legitimacy theory which Franck has not
denied. Briefly, rules possess legitimacy when they are complied with
regularly, and legitimate rules elicit high levels of compliance.
24. Id. at 7.
25. See EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS CRISIS (1942); KOSKENNIEMI, supri
note 2.
26. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 26-27.
27. Id. at 8.
28. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)
[hereinafter THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY]; Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy and International
Law, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988). For a critique and application of the concept of legitima-
cy, see also Jose Alvarez, The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of The Power of
Legitimacy Among Nations by Thomas M. Franck, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 199 (1991).
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The four components of legitimacy are, by now, familiar. Legitimate
rules possess determinacy.29 Determinacy can be textual, i.e., clear on
the face of the instrument or document, or can be provided by insti-
tutional interpretation. Franck makes the point that justice can come into
clear conflict with determinacy. This is particularly the case with idiot
rules where simplicity or clarity leads to absurdity. 30 The same can be
said of symbolic validation, a second component of legitimacy, which in
seeking to preserve those special anthropological signals and cues of the
legal system also reinforces a peculiarly conservative attachment to rules
with pedigree, regardless of the substantive fairness of these rules.31
Coherence, the third element of legitimacy, is more obviously
congruent with fairness.32 Treating like cases alike is a basic principle of
justice, as is the need to ensure that the application of different
rules/treatments accords with a coherent underlying principle. Of course,
exceptions to rules of general application can also be coherent if they
promote an overall goal of the "legislative" scheme. Franck gives as an
example of this, the General System of Preferences exception to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rule which prohibits
preferential trading, the so-called most favored nation status rule. This
exception is coherent because it promotes the overall aim of increased
trade for all nations by setting up a system of temporary advantage for
the least advantaged nations. This rule ". . . advances distributive justice
while minimising the concomitant discounting of the GATT system's
legitimacy . . . .3 Thus, the stability of the system (free trade) is en-
sured at the same time as substantive fairness (distributive justice) is
promoted. A good example of the discursive management of competing
imperatives, one might think. However, perhaps a more egalitarian,
socialist model of discursive management (disparaged earlier by Franck)
might also achieve this outcome. Here, debt forgiveness would be
combined with the retention of tariffs in the least developed countries in
order to protect nascent economies and threatened cultural forms. Free
trade could continue to flourish among OECD states.
It is interesting that Franck takes free trade to be an economic
grundnorm underpinning any legitimate economic order. Has there been
general agreement on this? It would surely be equally consistent and
coherent to establish an economic system based on the New Internation-
29. THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 28, at 50-66.
30. Id. at 67-83.
31. Id. at 91-110.
32. Id. at 135-49.
33. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 40.
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al Economic Order (NIEO), suitably modified by laissez-faire principles.
There was, after all, agreement on this which dissipated only under
pressure from the advantaged industrialized states who saw this order as
a threat to an even more basic condition of the world economic system,
i.e., the built-in advantage of the Western post-industrial state.
Adherence is the fourth element of legitimacy. This captures the
idea that technical rules of international law are subject to certain sec-
ondary rules of recognition and that these secondary rules of recognition
are themselves founded on an underlying canon of universal principles.'
No doubt this vertical symmetry suggests a system with the potential to
enhance legitimacy. However, the status of jus cogens norms, for exam-
ple, is still not settled and has been subjected to pointed critique from
both voluntarists and from the new stream.35 Equally, the content of
these universal principles has been found wanting by feminist critics.
36
Franck does not really attempt to answer these critics other than by
invoking the idea of community. Indeed, some of the examples he uses
do not support the proposition that specific state consent is trumped by
customary law or peremptory norms in the modern international legal
order. The United States, despite its objections, may have been "subject
to an extensive array of customary law" in the Nicaragua case37 but its
decision to withdraw from the case and from the system itself can
hardly give us confidence in the normative or persuasive powers of
community and custom. Equally, Franck is surely mistaken if he be-
lieves that no state since Hitler's Germany has challenged the fundamen-
tal norm of the international system which holds all states to be sover-
eign equals and therefore acknowledged to possess an "equality of
entitlements. '38 The whole idea of spheres of influence which marked
the Cold War era was premised on a denial of such entitlements to
sovereign equality. The incidents of such equality, namely control over
internal affairs and foreign policy, territorial integrity and effective
indigenous government, were completely lacking in Central America and
Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1990. Presidential doctrines from Mon-
roe's to Nixon's and Reagan's effectively abandoned any commitment
to such equality.
34. Id. at 183-94.
35. See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM.
J. INT'L L. 413 (1983); KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 281-83.
36. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15
HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (1993).
37. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (May 10)
(Provisional Measures) [hereinafter Nicaragua case].
38. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 45.
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B. Justice and Equity
These doubts aside, legitimacy is a useful way of analyzing the
compliance-pull of modem international law. Perhaps the major problem
with legitimacy, though, is that it cannot account for the dynamic ele-
ments within a system or the influence of justice in that system. As
critics of Fuller were quick to point out, generality and consistency
alone cannot ensure that standards of fairness are met. Most obviously,
these rule of law principles are minimum requirements which say noth-
ing about the content of the laws to be applied.
In order to meet these objections, Franck, following Rawls, adds a
second condition of fairness. This is distributive justice. Franck's dis-
tributive justice appeals to a "moral compass" shared by citizens who
are more likely to regard laws as legitimate if they combine right pro-
cess with fair distributional consequences. A tax law must be consis-
tently and generally applied (procedural fairness) and also effect
allocational redistribution to the disadvantaged groups within society
(substantive fairness). All this is quite familiar from recent egalitarian
liberal theory. Franck, unlike Rawls, does not seek to support these
principles with reference to an underlying foundational theory. Instead
he relies on an intuitive, unconvincing, and perhaps contradictory liberal
populism. In this discussion, there is too much reliance on potentially
problematic "deeply held popular beliefs" or empirically dubious as-
sumptions that Americans, for example, will resist laws that distribute
burdens unfairly.39 There is really no evidence to suggest that citizens in
many democratic polities (particularly the United States) possess this
moral sense. The recent congressional elections, if anything, tend to bear
out the opposite, i.e., that many Americans support policies that reallo-
cate social benefits away from the least-advantaged.
Franck, however, is right to say that justice does play some role
within the international system. The most salient use of justice occurs
when international tribunals and treaties invoke equity. Initially, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence which illustrates this
recourse to equity is described in a rather humdrum manner. Franck
takes us through estoppel, unjust enrichment, and acquiescence in cases
that are, by now, achingly familiar.4 Where Franck excels is in his
ability to organize the different approaches to equity into meaningful
compartments. These are differentiated according to the level of autono-
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id. at 47-54.
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my accorded to equity in decision-making and the proximity of each to
the application of abstract justice. Franck uses a tripartite typology to
characterize the various ways in which equity can be used. The most
familiar is "equity as corrective justice." We can see this form of equity
at work in the famous ICJ cases involving the continental shelf disputes
where equity is used to cure the obvious defects of a strictly legal
outcome. 41 And yet, as Franck remarks, this schism between law and
justice is dampened by the judicial opinions in these cases which seek to
make equity a norm of international law like any other norm.42 There is
an understandable desire to avoid the impression that this is the exercise
of unfettered judicial discretion. Unfortunately, for all this judicial
camouflage, the use of equity has not escaped charges of indeterminacy,
judicial subjectivism, and the like.
This is not likely to change as tribunals and treaties move in the
direction of Franck's other categories of equity: broadly conceived
equity and common heritage equity. With the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, broadly conceived equity has become a legal norm in itself. The
Convention refers explicitly to equitable principles, and one potential
limit on the application of such principles -'equidistance - has been
excised from the text altogether.43 Franck notes that in the Tunisia-Libya
Continental Shelf case, the Court, adopting the reading of equity from
UNCLOS II, stated that: "the equitableness of a principle . . . must be
assessed in the light of the usefulness for the purpose of arriving at an
equitable result."44 According to Franck, this is "distributive justice in
the driver's seat. 45 Given the tautological nature of the Tunisia-Libya
formula, one is tempted to add that the car currently has neither maps
nor a navigator. However, as Franck says, the Court in fact did use a
substantive principle of proportionality to resolve this dispute and a later
dispute involving the United States and Canada over the Gulf of
Maine. 46 This certainly confirms a rhove to distributive justice in se-
lected cases particularly since the Court in Gulf of Maine was also
willing to apply an extra-legal rule of corrective equity to ensure that
41. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
42. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 56.
43. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, 11th Sess., Art. 83(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), revised by
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122/Corr. 3 (1982), and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122/Corr. 8 (1982),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1286. See also FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 68.
44. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 68.
45. Id.
46. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246, 342-43 (Oct. 12). See also FAIRNESS, supra note I I, at 71.
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any decision based on proportionality (broadly conceived equity) did not
have dire consequences for the fishermen of Nova Scotia or New Eng-
land (corrective equity).
Common heritage equity has the potential to be even more revolu-
tionary in that distributive justice is here applied not to states but to
individuals in a global, intergenerational sense. The Madrid Protocol to
the Antarctic Treaty is perhaps the best example of this use of fairness
in the international legal order.47
Ultimately, however, the role of equity as fairness is likely to re-
main controversial. First, there is always a point at which judicial dis-
cretion must be employed. Franck does not indicate how that discretion
should be used. He suggests that judges here act as juries in the name of
community values, introducing flexibility and "common sense" to the
application of legal, principles. Alas, these notions of community and
common sense are contentious enough in relatively homogenous national
societies. Any attempt to incorporate such concepts into judicial deci-
sionmaking in the international order is likely to result in the influence
of even more egregious biases and ideological preferences than in these
domestic systems. Second, it is at least debatable whether current politi-
cal conditions must inevitably lead to more distributive justice. As
Franck acknowledges: "The growing inequality in the distribution of
desired goods indicates that the formal equality of states before the law
must be made actual by recourse to notions of justice. 48 Whether this
"must" is a moral imperative or historical inevitability is surely the
central question. Franck appears to be suggesting that this disparity in
wealth will lead to a greater role for fairness in the international system.
However, the reverse could equally be true. It might be that fairness in
relation to economic wealth is less influential now than at any time in
the past fifty years. The global market is simply not susceptible to the
demands of justice in a way it might have been thirty or forty years ago.
Again, within national contexts, growing gaps between the rich and poor
have led to a greater political and legislative will to dismantle these
institutions which ensure fairness and redistribution. It is incorrect to
assert that "... remedial programs ... are widely accepted by all
classes as a necessary part of the social compact. '49 There is simply no
consensus among political elites that these programs should continue in
the United States or in the United Kingdom, far less that they should be
47. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
1455. See also FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 78.
48. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 79.
49. Id. at 414.
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established in more recently developed countries such as Indonesia or
the Philippines. The rich do not remain rich as an unfortunate "by-
product of deliberate incentives to foster excellence ...and risk-tak-
ing"50 but, in the United States at least, because of a massive series of
state and private subsidies in favour of the already rich, e.g., the system
of affirmative action in favour of alumni at elite educational institutions
or corporate tax deductions.
Franck's examples drawn from equity do not encourage a sense of
optimism. Equity has been used to fill out incomplete law, and in this
function it has been occasionally successful. Its role in ameliorating the
continuing maldistribution of primary goods in the international order
has been negligible. Indeed, such a role is likely to fail the legitimacy
test instantly.
Of course, Professor Franck is fully aware of the potentially con-
flicting nature of the two principles of fairness. Having settled on these
preconditions for fairness discourse and identified the content of legit-
imacy (procedural fairness) and distributive justice (moral fairness),
Franck attempts to show how the inevitable tensions between the two
independent elements of fairness can be managed. Koskenniemi has
demonstrated, at some length, that reconciling them is impossible. The
various binary oppositions that underpin the international legal order -
justice and order, apology and utopia, norm and deed, cannot be brought
to a resolution. Indeed, such resolution would be fatal to the internation-
al legal enterprise."
Is the "management" of these tensions the answer to Koskenniemi's
conundrum? Franck accepts that resolution may be impossible or unde-
sirable, preferring instead a sort of technocratic balancing of these com-
peting impulses on a case-by-case basis. Thus he situates himself in a
school of liberalism which emphasizes process over substance. 2 Perhaps
the way to assess this balancing act is to apply the theory of fairness to
a series of substantive areas of law.
50. Id.
51. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2.
52. See, e.g., HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 16. See also lain Scobbie's
excellent critique of Koskenniemi's assumption that liberalism, in order to be plausible and
coherent, has to be a closed, fully resolved system. lain Scobbie, Towards the Elimination of
International Law: Some Radical Scepticism about Sceptical Radicalism, 1990 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 339, 346-52.
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III. FAIRNESS AND DEMOCRACY 53
Professor Franck's essay "The Right to Democratic Governance"
published in the American Journal of International Law in 199154 and
included here as Chapter 4, has given rise to a cottage industry of
academic scholarship.55 Most of this writing has been affirmative in
nature and the right to democracy or the democratic entitlement is now
a fixture in international law theorizing. As I have argued recently,
democracy is rather less regularly affirmed in the world outside the
academy. 6 For former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III, quoted
at the beginning of this chapter, "legitimacy ... flows not from the
barrel of a gun but from the will of the people." Regrettably, the legiti-
macy of most United Nations members continues to be founded on
violence, despite the optimism of both Baker and Franck.
The difficulties with Professor Frank's right to democratic gover-
nance can be divided into two groups. The first relates to the substan-
tive, political problems with the whole notion of democratic governance;
and the second, to his use of a series of largely indeterminate and form-
less international legal principles to support an argument for the emer-
gence of the right to democratic governance and to provide sources for
that right.
The first group of objections question the legitimacy, both legal and
political, of the norm. These have been considered in great detail else-
where and so will be mentioned only briefly here.57 In this category,
there are three significant problems with the idea of democratic gover-
nance. First, there is the inadequacy of the empirical evidence for the
purported ascendancy of the democratic impulse. Many of the states
Franck takes to be "legally committed to permit open, multiparty, secret-
ballot elections with a universal franchise"58 are surely democracies only
in name. Though Franck argues that the fair conduct of these elections
is "another question," it is surely the central question for a theory pur-
porting to grapple with issues of substantive distributive justice. The
53. This section is drawn from my recent article, Gerry J. Simpson, Imagined Consent:
Democratic Liberalism in International Legal Theory, 17 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 103 (1994).
54. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992).
55. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law,
17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992).
56. See Simpson, supra note 53, at 123-25.
57. See, e.g., Otto, supra note 13.
58. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 85.
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case for including Angola, Croatia, Guatemala, Honduras, Belarus
(included twice on the list, once as Byelorussia), Liberia (!), Malaysia,
and Serbia, in a list of democracies is surely weak if one wants to avoid
doing damage to the whole idea of democratic governance. The evi-
dence relied upon by Franck has come mostly from Central America,
central Europe and South America as well as the Iberian Peninsula.
Leaving aside the issue of whether democracy has really been en-
trenched in some of these regions, there is the additional failing that the
norm has not taken root in large parts of Africa and Asia. This is differ-
ent from saying that states in this region are undemocratic (though this
may be the case). Rather the problem is that some notions of electoral
and contractual democracy are alien to many cultures which may well
practice their own forms of participation that are not recognizably demo-
cratic. This is equally a problem with indigenous societies and minori-
ties. The democratic norm imposed on indigenous cultures is perceived
by them as a form of neo-colonialism.
A second, associated, problem lies in excessively formalistic and
narrow conceptions of the right as elaborated by Franck. There is little
consideration of the economic conditions and cultural contexts which
make democracy meaningful. Nor is there any regard for the savage
effects that decades of repression have had on the democratic conscious-
ness. One wonders whether traumatized electorates in El Salvador,
Angola, Mozambique, Guatemala, Argentina, and Nicaragua are capable
of enjoying the norm of democratic governance to any realistic extent.
Third, there is the conflict between this norm of legitimacy and
other more basic and dispositive values within the international system,
with the concomitant impossibility of enforcing this right to democracy
while remaining committed to the current, liberal international legal
regime. Ultimately, democratic liberalism comes into serious conflict
with many fundaments of international law. The 1970 Declaration on
Friendly Relations, for example, contains the following provision:
"Every state has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic,
social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another
State.,,59 The norm of democratic governance threatens to circumscribe
that choice too drastically. Such a norm, with its almost "holy" status,
could undermine the search for overlapping consensus.
However, a more serious set of objections to the norm is that it
relies on a pair of international legal principles which lack the determi-
nacy and content that Franck himself regards as threshold requirements
59. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
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for the emergence of new norms. These are the right to self-determina-
tion and the right to free expression.
Any potential role self-determination may have had in promoting a
norm of democratic governance has been diminished by two interpreta-
tive trends. The first trend has been toward conservative and statist
definitions of the principle. This process reached its apogee during the
period when self-determination came to be identified exclusively with
decolonization. In effect, self-determination has most assiduously served
the same state system it pretends to assail. A more recent, second, trend
has involved the misappropriation of the label. The elasticity of self-
determination, throughout history, has ensured its longevity, but dimin-
ished its legitimacy.60 It has had to be capable of surviving inconsistent
application, absorbing anomalies and, ultimately, satisfying powerful
strategic and political interests and realities without compromising its
revolutionary appeal. In this latter role, it has frequently flattered to
deceive and in the process has evolved into an open-textured, highly
manipulable, and indiscriminately employed slogan. It vests in all those
who use it a tainted respectability but is, at the same time, deprived of
clarity and the possibility of legal content. The most startling recent
examples of this are the claims to self-determination and a white home-
land or volkstadt made by elements of the white minority in South
Africa and the comparably disingenuous assertions of a right to self-
determination by the Bosnian Serbs. Clearly, then, self-determination, at
present, lacks both the definition and applicability to be salvaged from
its descent into incoherence.
Free speech doctrine in international law is in a similar state, lacking
the determinacy and coherence that Franck deems necessary for found-
ing a legitimate and mature rule of international law. The incoherence of
free speech stems from the extremely open-textured and heavily quali-
fied nature of the right as laid out in Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.6' Here we have a rather illiberal
and potentially anti-democratic enunciation of the free speech principle.
The core right to speak freely on political matters is hedged to such an
extent that it ceases to exist in any meaningful sense. The Article 19
right certainly bears no resemblance to the libertarian version of free
expression prevalent in many Western states, notably the United States.
Problems related to the indeterminacy of the rule spring from the
absence of any authoritative pronouncements on what Article 19 actually
60. See THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 28, at 153-74.
61. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 178.
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protects. Indeed, the right to free expression is something of a rarity in
international human rights law, being less well-developed internationally
than in many domestic systems. This lacuna is hardly filled with refer-
ence to the work of the Human Rights Committee [HRC]. Dominic
McGoldrick, whom Franck quotes in support of his thesis, stated at the
conclusion of his analysis of Article 19: "The fundamental norms within
article 19 remain undefined and largely undeveloped. It appears unlikely
that the work of the HRC will redress the disappointing record of the
United Nations concerning freedom of expression. 62
Even if one agrees with Franck that a right to free expression is
crystallizing in international law, it is unlikely to be one as closely
linked to the democratic process as he imagines. The conceptual leap
from free expression as the human right to criticize government without
suffering harm to free expression as the right to participate fully in the
democratic affairs of the state is not one the international community
seems inclined to make. Indeed, while the first, much weaker, version of
the right remains controversial, it is unlikely that the more sophisticated
and deeper right will attain normative standing in international law. The
Committee has never been a staunch advocate of free expression, prefer-
ring to give states a margin of appreciation when evaluating the effect
of speech. This approach is perhaps exemplified in the Hertzberg case
63
where the HRC found that the Finnish Broadcasting Authority could
invoke parts of Article 19 as a justification for banning the transmission
of homosexual ideas and material on radio and television. 4
Ultimately, Professor Franck has provided us with a stimulating and
challenging account of the possibilities of universalizing democratic
governance. However his claim that this norm is now a global enti-
tlement cannot be maintained in the face of the inchoate and ambiguous
nature of the legal standards upon which it is said to rest, namely the
norm of self-determination and the principle of free expression.
IV. FAIRNESS AND SELF-DETERMINATION
As well as lending equivocal support to the doctrine of democratic
governance, self-determination as fairness is considered in a separate
62. DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 471 (1991).
63. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
Annex XIV, at 161, 165, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982).
64. When the committee charged with drafting the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights convened to write Article 19, they originally published a list that included no
less than 26 possible limitations on the right to free expression. See MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE
TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 375 (1987).
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chapter. The principle of self-determination has been subject to exhaus-
tive analysis over the years.65 These analyses can be grouped historically
into two periods. The first was the outpouring of scholarship which
concerned itself with colonial self-determination, i.e., the creation of
new states in Africa and Asia following a process of decolonization. 66 A
second, more recent brand of scholarship, has focused on what Franck
calls postmodern neo-tribalism. 67 This form of self-determination has
tended to affect states rather than empires.
There is little doubt that the law of self-determination has been in
turmoil for many years. This is partly because the principle encapsulates
two contradictory impulses: the revolutionary spirit of secession and
group self-assertion and the conservative tendencies of state sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Self-determination, like nationalism, is both a
force for the creation of states and a threat to the existence of individual
states. Self-determination led to the establishment of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and may well lead to its ultimate disintegration. In
Franck's terms, the legitimacy of ensuring a state's control over its
domestic affairs and territory comes into conflict with the fairness of
giving peoples a right to pursue their own destinies.
Postmodern neo-tribalism is the term Franck uses for the
nationalisms arising in places as disparate as the former Yugoslavia,
Somalia, and Scotland. I remember finding this term curious when
Franck introduced it at a seminar in Amsterdam several years ago. Back
then, it was postmodem tribalism. The "neo-" does not add much to the
meaning except to answer critics who felt tribalism was a pejorative
term for self-determination movements. Where Franck is right, is to see
65. See, e.g., Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. 51 (1988)
(demonstrating the internal tensions in theories and applications of self-determination in
mainly judicial materials); Deborah Z. Cass, Rethinking Self-Determination: A Critical
Analysis of Recent Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 21 (1992); Robert
McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 857
(1994). Two worthwhile book-length treatments have appeared recently. See ANTONIO
CASSESSE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (1995); MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINA-
TION (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1995).
66. See, e.g., Leo Gross, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law, in NEW
STATES IN THE MODERN WORLD 136 (Martin Kilson ed., 1975); Rupert Emerson, Self-
Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971); Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination and World
Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1976).
67. See, e.g., Philip Allott, The Nation as Mind Politic, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1361 (1992); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation,
16 YALE J. INT'L L 177 (1991); Edward M. Morgan, The Imagery and Meaning of Self-
Determination, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355 (1988); Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of
Sovereignty, STAN. J. INT'L L. (1996) (forthcoming); Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination,
Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
867 (1989).
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nationalism as a threat to the grand designs of the great mutually antag-
onistic projects of modernity: liberalism and marxism. However,
postmodernism is a rather misleading term. Nationalism is the antithesis
of the postmodern style. Postmodernism emphasizes the multiple, con-
tingent, and heterogeneous; nationalism is a doctrine of exclusion and
absolutes. In particular, postmodernism is concerned with bringing out the
discontinuous and fragmentary nature of the tribe or ethnicity,68 while
nationalism is dependent on historical certainties and ethnic rigidities.
It is also doubtful whether there really has been "a resurgence of
neo-tribalism." Self-determination, as Franck recognizes, has been an
issue for international lawyers for at least a century. No doubt, European
and North American scholars have again engaged with nationalism as a
result of the carnage in the Balkans and the break-up of the Soviet
Union. However, using Quebec and Scotland as examples of this resur-
gence is misconceived. Scottish nationalism, for example, has been a
low-level political issue in the United Kingdom since the Act of Settle-
ment in 1707. Biafra, Bangladesh, and Hungary exercised the minds of
previous generations as much as Yugoslavia and Chiechnya do today.
This is not a new crisis but simply the same old one - playing itself
out in different and more strategically sensitive locales.
Perhaps a better way of conceptualizing the self-determination issue
is to see it as a series of decolonizations rather than nationalist revivals.
Nationalisms tend to simmer away throughout history. What propels a
national movement onto the world stage is the disintegration of the
empire or state of which it is a part. Thus, we are witnessing the decolo-
nization of the twentieth century's second wave of imperial structures -
the communist empire of Eastern Europe. The examples drawn from
beyond this context (Quebec, the Sudan, Sri Lanka) simply resonate
more in the light of this historical moment notwithstanding the mimetic
nature of some nationalisms.
The more important question remains: can we devise a normative
matrix capable of resolving the competing claims of the state and the
ethnie, the empire and the nation? This is Franck's task and he begins
with a limpid synthesis of recent developments in the practice of rec-
ognition and self-determination into a series of guiding principles which
should be required reading for anyone studying in this area.69 However,
68. See, e.g., JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE (1988).
69. For example, see Franck's nuanced discussions of uti posseditis, the enumeration of
the grounds on which a secession will be deemed legitimate, and the impact of refugee
movements on our understandings of domestic jurisdiction and appropriate thresholds for
intervention. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 164-67.
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the role of fairness in all this is less easily established. It would be a
mistake to see self-determination as simply a matter of reconciling or
managing the perennial conflict between justice (self-determination,
secession, human rights) and order or legitimacy (statehood, territorial
integrity). The self-determination problem is not one that fits easily into
such conceptualizations. Franck seems to appreciate this in his
"deconstruction" (a word rather carelessly thrown around in this chapter)
of the various problems of self-determination. Very .often, counter-
claims against secessionist movements can be seen as justice claims
(e.g., the Bosnian state's right to territorial integrity) while some self-
determination claims themselves possess impeccable legitimacy creden-
tials (e.g., East Timor's right to independence).
In the end, Franck favors a context-based approach to justice in
which "a process of fairness discourse" generates results according to
the key variables of the dispute. Franck identifies two of these variables
as the ethnic homogeneity of the seceding- entity and the level of human
rights abuse suffered by the claimants. These variables will not be
unfamiliar to those acquainted with the self-determination literature.
However, neither Franck nor numerous writers before him have ex-
plained how these variables are to be employed. Context-based reason-
ing cannot work if the various contexts are all accorded equal weight.
Franck uses the example of Slovenia to show how his
"deconstructive" technique can help clarify an issue better than the
"idiot rules" he deprecates in his discussion of legitimacy.70 An idiot
rule might say either that Slovenia was not entitled to self-determination
since it did not fit the classic colonial model or that as a people it was
automatically entitled to secession. Neither of these idiot rules is satis-
factory. The first errs on the side of order by denying any right to self-
determination outside an exhausted colonial context. The result would be
the recognition of a right with no potential recipients or beneficiaries.
The second rule would invite chaos by allowing everyone from the East
Timorese to the Kennedy Family at Hyannisport (Franck's example of
the reductio ad absurdum)" to secede.
Professor Franck's "deconstructive technique" is just old fashioned
contextual analysis. 72 Those expecting Derridean insights will be disap-
70. THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 28, at 74.
71. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 160.
72. Professor Franck writes with great clarity and obvious enthusiasm. Occasionally,
however, we see signs of the worst excesses of New Haven diction. Thus we have the
unhelpful borrowings ("deconstruction"), the neologisms ("normatize" etc.) and the inelegant
("discursively persuasive").
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pointed. In the above example, the Slovenian claim would be assessed
according to a number of variables such as the level of human rights
abuses suffered by the Slovenes within the Yugoslav federation, the
level of representation accorded the Slovenes in that federation, the
ethnic make-up of the Slovenians, and the willingness of the Slovenes to
recognize the rights of other ethnic minorities within Slovenia. Apart
from the problem of according relative weight to each of these indica-
tors, there is nothing value-neutral about them. Franck would like us to
believe that these are components of a fairness discourse that mandates
no particular outcome but simply ensures the fairness of the process.
Yet, these variables are themselves highly controversial. Is there any
reason why a group suffering human rights abuses should have a better
moral claim to secede than a more fortunate group? Allan Buchanan has
suggested that a truly liberal understanding of secession would view it
more as divorce where the grounds for divorce include incompatibility
as well as violence.73 Franck compares the oppressed Bangladeshis with
the emancipated Quebecois, the former possessing an entitlement to
secede, the latter already enjoying the benefits of self-determination
within the Canadian federation.
Even more controversially, Franck suggests that the claim of "ethni-
cally-homogeneous" Slovenia to self-determination should be distin-
guished from that of the multi-ethnic Bosnia's. What is the intended
normative impact of such a distinction? It is not always obvious from
Franck's descriptions, since he constantly reminds us that the use of
such variables "does not predict the outcome of the fairness discourse."
The trouble with liberalisms as agnostic as this is that they leave open
interpretations that may have illiberal consequences. For example, one
way to distinguish Slovenia and Bosnia is to say that the Slovenian
claim is to be preferred over Bosnia's because of Slovenia's more
settled ethnic configuration (Franck, himself, seems to hint at this when
he compares Slovenia's claim with Bangladesh's and Bosnia's with
Quebec's). The dangerous consequence of this sort of approach is that it
can lead to general preference for ethnic self-determination over civic
self-determination. One might equally say that the Bosnian model of
heterogeneous social organization (though obviously not the reality in
this particular case) is the preferred one.
Ultimately, I do not find fairness discourse a plausible method for
resolving self-determination disputes. Fairness provides no indication as
to how the various variables are to be organized in characterizing a
73. See ALLAN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM
FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA TO QUEBEC (1991).
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dispute. There is too much reliance on open-textured principles variously
described as "pragmatic normative guidelines" or prefixed with adjec-
tives like "rational" and "balancing." To be sure, "each case is differ-
ent," but the ad hoc approach deployed by the Europeans, and approved
of here, has not been a complete success and has been subject to ex-
tremely critical analysis by other writers.74 As description, fairness as
self-determination is a comprehensive overview of the complexities of
this thorny issue. But prescriptively it defers too much to an unex-
plained legitimacy process and an index of validity that counsels con-
text-based decisionmaking but fails to provide a way of structuring these
contexts.
V. FAIRNESS AND THE USE OF FORCE
In Chapters 7-9 Franck examines the use of force by United Nations
institutions and member states. This is an area in which Franck has
published frequently and his ideas are revisited here with clarity and
authority. Chapter 7 is primarily concerned with the Security Council's
jurisdictional reach under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The author
takes us through fifty years of United Nations practice from the early
Arab-Israeli wars to the crises in the former Yugoslavia, organizing the
case studies into easy cases, where the Security Council's legitimacy is
unquestionable (North Korea's aggression in 1950, Iraq's in 1990), and
hard cases, where the law remains fluid and controversial (the Congo in
1960, Libya in 1992, the former Yugoslavia ongoing). Franck concludes
that both procedurally and substantively, the Council's actions have
often lacked legitimacy and that, as a consequence, its behavior is not
always regarded as fair. The problems seem to be threefold. First, at a
procedural level, there is insufficient transparency in the procedures of
the Security Council. In 1992, for example, there were 129 formal
meetings of the Council and 188 informal meetings. Much of the deci-
sionmaking takes place in unofficial contacts with little public oversight.
This problem is compounded by the failure of the Council to provide
constitutional or theoretical justification for many of its recent forays
into uncharted waters. The Council has rarely felt the need to argue for
the legitimacy of its findings and actions in cases like the Lockerbie
bombing or the various interventions in post-war Iraq. Second, the
Council has tended to act rather inconsistently since the beginning of its
activist phase. Interventions in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia have
74. See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 51-57
(1993).
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tended to proceed on an ad hoc basis while equally worthy cases have
been neglected, most notably in the case of Rwanda. Third, and very
much associated with the first two problems, the Council has failed to
develop a long-term strategy for action in cases of either massive human
rights abuses or civil wars. Instead it has adopted a number of quite
innovative measures that tend to operate in isolation and have yet to
become part of a coherent policy.
A possibility that Franck canvasses briefly is that of judicial review.
Drawing on the Lockerbie Provisional Measures decision at the ICJ,
Franck sketches a potential role for the ICJ as a guardian of the Coun-
cil's legitimacy. However, this would surely require a full blown theory
of judicial review in international law. Only if equipped with such a
theory could the Court act as a counter-weight to the increasingly auton-
omous decisionmaking of the Security Council.
Chapter 9 revisits many of these collective security issues and also
takes up the question of the relationship between Article 51 (the right to
self-defense) and Chapter VII. Overall, Franck anticipates an expanded
role for the Security Council in repelling aggression, whereby the indi- •
vidual and collective right to self-defense is almost wholly usurped. The
move to legitimacy and fairness is also a move to institutions. In the
interim, the grounds for claiming a unilateral right to self-defense should
be judged not by the state itself but by either the Security Council with
the aid of fact-finding teams (an excellent suggestion) or by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in an advisory opinion.
Franck describes this coming pre-emptive role of the Security Coun-
cil in matters of war and peace as "a dramatic return to just war theo-
ry."75 This is perhaps an unfortunate analogy, given the propensity of
just wars to descend into displays of self-righteous violence and brutali-
ty. Nevertheless, if the Security Council is to be endowed with the
authority to wage or sanction just war, it is important that it do so
constitutionally and under rules of procedural legitimacy. For Franck,
fairness at the Security Council is a combination of process transparency
and substantive equality. The Security Council must "engage in open
fairness discourse" and according to set procedures and rules. More
importantly, equality must be ensured both in terms of the membership
of the Council and the coherence of its decisions to act.
In Chapter 8, Franck argues that the search for fairness in war has
resulted in the laws regulating both recourse to war and the means
75. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 313.
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employed during war. This version of history as progress essays two
principal themes. The first assumes that the laws of war (jus in bello)
have had a progressively civilizing effect on war at the same time as they
have become more complex and inclusive. The second, traces a historical
arc from the early, post-Westphalian positivist view of war as an essen-
tially self-regulated activity (Vattel, Clausewitz), to the more "contextual-
relativist" current scene in which international institutions are "endowed
with supranational. power to outlaw and prevent war" (jus ad bellum).
In his discussion of the laws of war, Franck recognizes that some-
times these laws lack applicability for jurisdictional reasons (e.g., internal
disturbances) but seems less concerned with the failure of either the
international community or various protagonists to enforce them. Instead,
his narrative concentrates on a series of textual and institutional innova-
tions (the Geneva Conventions, the War Crimes Tribunals) that have yet
to bear fruit in enforcement terms on the modem battlefield. Indeed, one
could plausibly argue that the enlarged scope and detail of the laws of
war has been accompanied by an increase in the brutality of armed
conflict. Some writers actually go as far as to implicate the laws of war
in this dehumanizing process.7 6 According to this view, the laws of war
can serve to justify acts of violence as much as to prevent them. This is
because of the central importance of military necessity as a trumping
mechanism built into the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. A conse-
quence of this process can be seen in the widespread acceptance by
international lawyers that the Gulf War bombings which led to the death
of thousands of Iraqi civilians Were justified under the laws of war." In
1939, Neville Chamberlain could remind the world that, "it is against
international law to bomb civilians." No such claim could plausibly be
made now. Instead, we can trace not a trajectory of progress but a moral
descent in comparing, say, the world community's horror at the bombing
of Guernica in 1938 to its indifference at the destruction of Baghdad in
1991.
The second thesis, that there is a move to institutions in the laws
regulating war, is certainly more plausible. Collective security is now a
matter quite clearly within the Security Council's jurisdiction. Unilateral
action is likely to remain the exception rather than the rule. Whether the
Security Council can be accurately described as acting in "humanity's
common interest" is at least moot. Franck discusses this in the next
76. Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History
of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49 (1994).
77. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452,
465-67 (1991).
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chapter in more detail. I think the better view is that international society
is at a transitional mid-way point between the pre-Charter period of tribal
competition or national egoism and the situation described by Franck of
supranational institutions working in the collective interest.78 At present,
many international institutions are in the process of establishing rules and
principles which have the potential to hasten the move to an international
society based on common humanity (the HRC, the World Trade Organi-
zation, the ICJ). However, this progressive vision continues to be haunted
by economic disorder, humanitarian catastrophe, growing inequalities,
and a frightening potential for violence both within and between states.
A disturbing gulf between international law's rhetorical claims and the
reality of an often anarchic world order threatens the otherwise promising
doctrinal and institutional efforts of international lawyers.
VI. Is INTERNATIONAL LAW FAIR?
Is international law fair? Perhaps Professor Franck would answer
cautiously that it is becoming fair, that fairness discourse is the dominant
discourse. The evidence adduced in favor of the Franckian hypothesis is
at times impressive. Fairness considerations are infectious, travelling
freely from one area of international law to the next. There is judicial
fairness, administrative fairness, and institutional fairness. Best of all
there is redistributive, economic fairness. Anarchy is giving way not to
utopia or apology but, more prosaically, to a "community with systemic,
systematic interactions and utilitarian regimes. 79
Professor Franck calls this the post-ontological era for international
law.80 However, I am not convinced that our ontologies are quite as passd
as our modernisms. According to Franck, international law is no longer
compelled to defend its existence. The question is no longer that dinner-
party staple, "Is international law really law?" but instead, "Is interna-
tional law fair?" However, the idea of an international law occupying
some public transnational space is one that continues to require defend-
ing. The challenge comes not from the recalcitrant sovereign state but
from an equally unsympathetic foe, the dynamic and deregulated global
market. Fairness is hardly the animating spirit in the boundary-less
financial markets. Indeed, regulation of any stripe is antithetical to this
global economic order.
78. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 283.
79. Id. at 477.
80. Id. at 6.
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Franck emphasizes the sense of community, the shared perceptions
of fairness, and the multiple linkages between, for example, trade and
human rights. Certainly these are interdependent times and there is much
talk of global community, but frequently these shared perceptions of
fairness give way to claims of cultural relativism or warnings against
revived hegemonies. Even more pointedly, in the critical relationship
between human rights and trade there has been some evidence of
decoupling. Relations between China and the United States, between
Australia and Indonesia, and between the United Kingdom and Nigeria
bear witness to a cynical disengagement of moral imperatives from
economic policy.
A fairer questioner might ask if Franck's thesis explains public
international law convincingly. Let me conclude by identifying two
significant and connected weaknesses in fairness analysis.
A. Application
While legitimacy and redistributive justice are useful ways to view
international law, they do not always provide a detailed enough theoret-
ical framework through which to understand or restructure doctrine and
practice. Too often fairness is synonymous with a commitment to an
intuitive liberal reasonableness.
For example, Professor Franck tells us fairness is enhanced by the
development of intricate judicial rules at the War Crimes Tribunal8' or by
establishing criteria for humanitarian intervention based on reasonable-
ness. Similarly, the solution to self-determination disputes using fairness
discourse often involves simply taking into account the various contexts
of the dispute in order to produce nuanced solutions.
In more contentious cases, Professor Franck declines to apply fair-
ness to the problem. It would have been interesting to know how the
fairness doctrine could be used to evaluate the United States refusal to
ratify Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention. Or how self-
determination might apply to indigenous peoples, or why the NIEO of
the 1970s was less fair than the present economic system, given the
NIEO's emphasis on redistributive outcomes.
Occasionally, the fairness of an institution is measured using indi-
cators like the levels of bias among judges, or its willingness to hear the
arguments of both sides even in the case of non-appearance by a state
party to dispute before the ICJ. In these matters fairness sounds too much
like common-sense. Whenever Franck applies fairness to trickier issues,
81. Id. at 279.
Spring 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
the prescriptions border on the enigmatic. A recent problem for the ICJ
has involved the question of indispensable third parties. In the Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru case 2 and the Nicaragua case, 3 the Court
found that various third parties, though closely associated with the
dispute, were not so necessary to the proceedings that their absence
invalidated the Court's jurisdiction. Franck applies fairness theory to the
question of indispensable third parties in Chapter 10 on "Judicial Fair-
ness" but the opportunity to work through examples is lost. Instead, there
is a description of the Court's findings in Monetary Gold Removed from
Rome,84 Nicaragua, and Nauru followed by the suggestion that the
Court's decision to exercise jurisdiction in the later two cases "raises few
problems of fairness, as long as the Court is willing to allow interested
states sufficient latitude to intervene on their own initiative."" However,
in the case concerning East Timor,86 decided after this book was written,
Indonesia's absence was fatal to the admissibility of the dispute between
Australia and Portugal. Given that Indonesia would probably have been
permitted a right of intervention, does this mean the decision to decline
jurisdiction was unfair? Unfortunately, one gets little guidance from the
discussion as to how fairness discourse would apply to this central
problem of ICJ juirisdiction. No criteria are set out and no specific
guidelines are enumerated. The very issues where theory could be useful
are those left unexplored here by Franck.
B. Fairness and Neutrality
At the beginning of Chapter 10 on judicial fairness, Professor Franck
quotes from Distributive Justice.87 Morton Deutsch remarks that "An
individual's conception of what he is entitled to is determined by at least
five major kinds of influence: (1) the ideologies and myths about justice
that are dominant and officially supported in his society .... " Despite
this endorsement of Deutsch, Professor Franck appears quite non-
selfconscious about appealing to our intuitions about justice or dominant
standards of fairness. Nowhere is there a discussion of the mythic
82. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June 26)
(Preliminary Objections).
83. Nicaragua case, supra note 37.
84. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome (Italy v. Fr., U.K., U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June
15) (Preliminary Question).
85. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 343.
86. East Timor (Port. v Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. (June 30).
87. FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 316 (quoting M. DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 52
(1985)).
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foundations of justice-talk or the ideological content of ideas like fair-
ness.88 Professor Franck is as convinced as Rawls that his theory is
neutral among competing claims (within the parameters set by the no
trumping rule and the maximin principle). However, this liberalism is not
as ecumenical as Franck would have us believe. Sprinkled throughout the
text are the commitments, and preferences of ideology. The balancing of
legitimacy and justice is not a process but a definition of the limits of
possible outcomes. The redistributive possibilities of radical economic
reform are deemed beyond the pale because, though they may be just,
they could not possibly meet the requirements of legitimacy. This is why,
for example, the use of equity in judicial reasoning cannot be extended
to embrace substantive economic equality.
Most disappointingly, Franck never confronts the serious challenges
posed by international law's critical .and feminist schools. The new
stream rates a mention in an early footnote but the index reveals one
reference to "feudalism" but none at all to "feminism." Feminist inter-
national lawyers, in particular, have made two specific challenges to
international law. First, some feminists have suggested that the arguments
of international law are not neutral but instead. perpetuate a particular
way of looking at the world which disadvantages women. The process of
talking about international law (fairness discourse) appears neutral and
inclusive but actually limits the participation of women in a number of
subtle ways.89 Professor Franck's book is about this discourse and stands
or falls on the openness and inclusiveness of the process. It is remarkable
then that the most innovative recent critique of this process is ignored
altogether.
A second feminist argument questions the effect of international law
norms on women's lives. The principle of self-determination, laws
regulating the use of force, and the meaning of democracy have all been
subjected to this form of questioning. Again, there is no recognition of
these debates in Professor Franck's book. More generally, it is regrettable
that there is no explicit engagment. with any of the new movements
mentioned in this review.
CONCLUSION
Professor Franck has written an imaginative, ambitious and detailed
account of the role of fairness in international law. This book represents
88. See, e.g., JOSEPH C. SMITH, THE NEUROTIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL ORDER
(1990)..
89. See Knop, supra note 5, at 304-05.
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a major contribution to the defense of liberal theory in international legal
thought. Our understanding of law's normative underpinnings are en-
riched by this text. In this review, I have focused on some of the flaws
in Franck's grand theoretical design. Despite the length and density of
the text, Professor Franck has missed an opportunity to engage with the
new theoretical trends in international law. Ultimately, his liberalism
remains too skeletal and self-validating to serve as a complete answer to
international law's harshest critics.
